As a response to a problematic situation the rational act is probably always initiated by an indirect stimulating object through some highly developed meaning function. Unlike complex instinctive behavior the rational act is not only guided to its conclusion by intelligent functions, but is originated by a reflective consideration of ways and means.
Thus it becomes the basis for all transformative conduct, that is, action which remakes the environmental conditions through some function of creative imagination, while in the case of instinctive conduct the result is usually merely an adaptation to those conditions. The Specificity of Instincts. It is important to note that since instincts are simple and immediate responses to specific stimuli which bring innate action systems into function, they presumably must be specific in their results.
This view, however, is not generally held by psychologists, although some adhere to it so tenaciously that the observation of the indeterminateness and indefiniteness of human behavior influences them to deny the existence of instincts in the human being. While it is entirely demonstrable that mature persons possess no instincts, this must not be interpreted to mean, as Stout does, that human behavior in general has no instinctive foundation in the form of concrete action patterns.
An inquiry into the views entertained concerning the definiteness of instincts reveals the fact that what is frequently meant by an instinct is a neuro-muscular function. Thus Stout, for example, describes an instinct as a "purely biological adaptation comparable to the prearrangement of structure and function which in human beings subserves the digestion of food.
This fact Stout could have seen had he not been prevented by his general psychological standpoint from appreciating that the psychologist is interested in modes of response to stimuli, and not in expressions of mentality Apparently, Stout assumes the specificity of instincts, and from such a premise he concludes that there arc no instincts in the adult human being because he does not find man performing acts which express a mental process, through innately coordinated motor mechanisms.
When we turn to the work of Thorndike, [12] who is attempting to investigate the 'original nature of man,' we find much to commend in his description of the specific instinct responses. Beginning with the admirable intention to describe concrete facts of behavior, he scouts the viewpoint which makes of instincts generalized tendencies to bring about some vague result presumed to be beneficial to the organism.
Conceived in neuro-biological terms, it implies that man's 'original nature' remains forever a prominent part of his behavior equipment. From this fact arise several implications tending to misconstrue the actual character of instinctive behavior. In the first place, such a viewpoint cannot escape the implication that the human individual acts precisely as does the animal, since the former is fitted with a similar sort of neuro-muscular structure, and secondly, a more serious difficulty is that such a position leaves no room for the development of behavior.
The first difficulty must be understood as referring to the obvious faultiness of the attitude that human behavior is permanently like that of the lower animals. It is true that in the case of infants the acts are like those of the simpler organisms, but this is because we are observing simple instincts. In older children and adults the behavior has become integrated into intelligent conduct and is thus qualitatively different.
In answer to the possible reply of Thorndike that a sufficient differentiation of conduct in man and animals is allowed for by the combination of neural elements, we might suggest that such a way out of the difficulty would only result in describing complex abstractions instead of observable behavior. Human conduct is infinitely more complex in every. Obviously the neural connections are essential mechanisms in all behavior, and since the activities of man arc more complex than those of animals, these mechanisms must necessarily be more elaborate, but the nervous function cannot do anything more than mediate the spontaneous movements of the individual.
We cannot agree with Drever, [15] who is essentially a follower of McDougall, in his criticism that the lack of differentiation in Thorndike's theory between human and animal instincts points to the nonspecificity of instincts. Drever insists [16] that there is no genuine specificity in Thorndike's instincts, since, for example, the 'instinct to escape from restraint' is so complex as to involve in the case of a little child 'stiffening, writhing, and throwing back the head and shoulders' and in the older child also 'kicking, pushing, slapping, scratching and biting.
As a further argument against the specificity of instincts, Drever indicates that in some cases we cannot predict what a specific response will be, and the individual may try many different ones in succession. Thus, for example, under some conditions of stimulation the person may respond by flight or concealment, and in some cases by both reactions in turn. The writer is satisfied that instead of proving the nonspecificity of instincts, what Drever really shows is that human beings respond only by means of instinctive behavior and not with instincts.
To repeat, instead of responding merely with an innately organized reaction system, the individual reacts with a complex acquired reaction pattern, which in the course of his development has had an increased knowledge and affective factor added to it.
It is for this reason that the anger or fighting situation' calls out such a wide and varying series of actions. In order to explain such conduct it is entirely unnecessary to invoke a dubious interpretation involving an unwarranted conception of the nature and function of the emotions as Drever following McDougall does.
Drever seems to realize that human behavior is a complex function developed in interaction with stimulating circumstances, when he writes that "behavior will be largely determined, first of all, by the circumstances of the case, by what kind of response will best secure safety.
It will be determined, in the second place, by the intensity of the fear aroused, and two individuals may behave in two entirely different ways in response to the same situation, according to the degree of fear aroused. Were Drever thinking in terms of concrete behavior he would easily see that instinctive conduct is not the functioning of an 'end,' or 'instinctive impulse' with an intelligence entity to carry it out, [19] but that it is a definite response to a stimulus which involves in its specific mode of action the integration of numerous previous experiences.
In all cases of actual instinctive behavior the 'end' is gratuitously imposed upon. The adequate consideration of the stimulating auspices of behavior entirely removes the necessity of postulating teleological powers in the organism. The spectator may profit by Drever's attack upon Thorndike's position by observing that on the one hand in his endeavor to avoid "mystic potencies" Thorndike refuses to interpret behavior as it actually occurs, preferring to lean upon unreal if not mystic potencies, while on the other, Drever, [21] following McDougall, [22] describes behavior in a more acceptable manner, but does not hesitate to explain it as the result of metapsychological agency.
The second difficulty with Thorndike's view of instincts, namely, that it disregards the development of behavior, may be considered as a derivation from the first difficulty. It results in the misinterpretation of human action, which as we have seen has as its primary characteristic the process of integration. A critical study of such behavior indicates conclusively that not a single act of an adult person [23] is an original response, but always a complex development of acquired reaction systems.
It appears that Thorndike must think of instincts in the adult as drives or potencies of some sort, that is to say, at this point they have lost their specific character. In his failure to distinguish between instincts and instinctive conduct Thorndike vitiates his original excellent intention to describe actual psychological occurrences.
Consequently, his interpretation leaves unfulfilled. In not allowing for an interpretation of the actual responses which an organism makes in adapting itself to surrounding conditions, Thorndike's position results in an inert structuralism which prolongs the intellectual tradition of a permanent self.
The most zealous advocate of the non-specificity of instincts is probably McDougall who approaches the problem from the angle of social behavior. This author, impugns the theory of social action which assumes 'that man is a reasonable being who always intelligently seeks his own good and is guided in all his activities by enlightened self-interest. The ubiquity and persistence of certain types of action no doubt has influenced him to propound the hypothesis that the human 'mind' is constituted by the sum of innate tendencies which bring about the specific actions of the individual.
As will appear in the course of our discussion these tendencies McDougall believes to be permanent psychic entities. The assumption that instincts are the 'essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action necessarily implies therefore that they are general capacities to bring about certain actions, for otherwise there would be required an infinite number to account for all the variety of social behavior.
An impartial investigation of behavior clearly demonstrates the extravagance of assigning any absolute foundation for human conduct.
Thus for example, to insist upon instincts as the exclusive springs of action is to lose sight of. As a consequence of seeking an absolute factor in human behavior, McDougall reaches the same result as Thorndike, namely, a form of abstractionisin which adds little to the comprehension of such behavior.
The impuissance of McDougall's conception of instincts as an interpretation of conduct is instructively intimated in the existence of an uncrossable barrier between his exposition of instincts and his discussion of social behavior. Although he starts out with the assertion that an instinct is a psychophysical disposition, not only to act but also to perceive, attend, and feel, that is to say, a concrete action, [27] he really thinks of it as an enduring condition or faculty of some sort.
In all fairness to McDougall it must be said that he realizes the appalling chasm which separates his instincts from the complex behavior of the social type, for he develops a theory to account for the fact that instincts, while substantial elements, can still be the basis for all complex human action. This theory assumes that an instinct can be divided into 'three corresponding parts, whose activities are the cognitive, the affective and the conative features respectively of the total instinctive process.
Unfortunately for McDougall this theory glaringly exposes his indefensible position. For note, he allows for so much development in. In extricating himself from this difficulty McDougall further weakens his position, since in making the emotional aspect of the instinct the sole innate spring of action he runs counter to the fact which he himself admits, [32] namely, his inability to point out definite actual emotions in any but the 'principal' powerful instincts.
The precariousness of McDougall's position is not at all mitigated by his highly questionable identification of the affective component of an instinct with an emotion. The conclusion that we may draw from the imperfection of McDougall's view is that he does not fully realize that he is attempting to interpret instinctive conduct, which is an entirely different matter from demonstrating the function of instincts in all the complex actions of human beings.
He therefore starts from the wrong premises and is easily led to the bizarre idea of the substantial mental character of instincts. It is an egregious error for McDougall [34] to think that he is alone in believing that instincts are at the foundation of our mental life.
While there are criticisms of instinct theory, this does not mean that psychologists have given up on trying to understand how instincts can influence behavior. Modern psychologists understand that while certain tendencies might be biologically programmed, individual experiences can also play a role in how responses are displayed. In addition to instinct theory, there are other theories which have been proposed to help explain motivation. These include:. In actuality, none of these theories, including instinct theory, can fully explain motivation.
It's likely that components of all of these theories, as well as theories not yet proposed, are integrated in a way that results in the motivation for the behaviors of humans. Ever wonder what your personality type means? Sign up to find out more in our Healthy Mind newsletter. American Academy of Pediatrics. Newborn reflexes. Vicedo M.
The father of ethology and the foster mother of ducks: Konrad Lorenz as expert on motherhood. The grasp reflex and Moro reflex in infants: Hierarchy of primitive reflex responses. Int J Pediatr. Zilbersheid, U. American Journal of Psychoanalysis. James W. In: The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt and Company; Scheffer D, Heckhausen H. Trait theories of motivation. In: Heckhausen J, Heckhausen H, eds. Motivation and Action.
Springer; In the case of anger some of the movements evidently have a "use" value, provided actual combat is necessary or desirable. But the trembling of fear, whatever may be -aid of the tendencies to flight, is a questionable organic asset for an individual wishing to react most effectively -upon menacing surroundings. It must be admitted frankly that some of the motor responses displayed in emotional and instinctive discharges are unintelligible at present from the standpoint of utility.
The attempt has often been made to refer the preservation of such acts as have no obvious value for the conquest of the environment, and even, perhaps, a deleterious influence upon this task, to their physiological usefulness in restoring disturbed organic conditions. Thus, the gorging of. Of such explanations one can only say that they serve, at least, temporarily, decently to cloak our ignorance.
Nevertheless, there seems to be in the meantime no hesitation in any important quarter in accepting the general hypothesis already mentioned, that these racial habits which we designate emotions and instincts represent types of reaction which were useful at some time in the past history of the race, however problematical their usefulness may be at present.
Genetic Interrelations of Instincts. It seems probable that rudimentary forms of most of the instincts are encountered at a very early date, whereas the occasion for the expression of the matured reaction may be long postponed. Ribot has made it clear that in general those instinctive activities, such as fear and anger, which have to do most immediately with the maintenance of the physiological organism, and to which lie gives the name of "egotistical emotions," are the first to appear in infancy and the last to disappear in old acre or before the ravages of mental disease.
The more altruistic emotions and instincts are for the most part found in a developed condition much later. Thus, sympathy, in unequivocal form, anyhow, occurs only with some considerable mental development. Indeed, it has sometimes been questioned whether sympathy is truly instinctive at all, whether it does not rather reflect the conclusions of intelligent consideration.
But on the whole there seems no good reason to cavil at the evidences of its native character , especially as we can discern its seeming presence in certain animals. List of Human Instincts. Many authorities would add hunting to this list, and it must be admitted that in many races, and in many individuals of all races, it gives strong indications of a fundamentally instinctive nature.
It is, however, so honeycombed with the effects of experience, and so irregular in its appearance, that it may fairly be given a position among the disintegrating instincts. Walking and talking are also included by many writers. Whether they shall be counted in or not is, as we have already observed, simply a question of classification.
We may call them either chained reflexes or instincts, according to the criterion which we adopt for our divisions. James has added cleanliness to his list, and there are some facts which point to the correctness of this view, both in its application to men and to animals. But it is at best a very imperfect and erratic trait, as any mother of normal children can testify, and we may omit it in consideration of the necessary brevity of our discussion.
We shall similarly forego any description of sympathy and modesty. A perusal of our list brings at once to notice the union of instinct and emotion. A part of the terms apply primarily to acts, and so connect themselves with the common implication of the term instinct; whereas the other part suggests much more immediately the conscious feelings characteristic of the several forms of emotional experience. Imitation, play, and constructiveness are examples of the first kind of term; fear, anger, and jealousy illustrate the second.
A few comments upon each of the instincts mentioned may serve to emphasise helpfully the typical conditions under which they. It only remains to notice that in little children, despite some irregularity in different individuals, the normal provocatives are represented by strange objects, frequently by fur, by strange places, and especially by strange people, by being left alone, by darkness, and even occasionally by black objects; and by noises, particularly if very loud and unfamiliar.
In later life, in addition to the fear which arises from the presence of actually dangerous situations, such as the menace of a great conflagration, many persons are seized with dizziness and a more or less acute terror upon finding themselves on a very high place, even though the possibility of falling over is efficiently precluded by railings, etc.
Others are frightened by anything which verges upon the supernatural. Even the cold-blooded materialist of polite fiction feels his unsentimental blood curdle just a bit at the rehearsal of a thrilling ghost story, and only the possessor of practiced nerves can be alone on a dark night in a cemetery, or a thick wood, without some " creepiness " of the hair and skin.
All of us are likely to find that in the midst of a violent tempest, whether on land or sea, the howling of the wind is a distinct source of mental anxiety quite disproportionate to our sober, intellectual apprehension of its real danger.
All these things take hold of our racial instincts, and however vigorously our individual experience attempts through its cortical machinery to put a veto on such nonsense, our lower brain centres refuse to abandon their world-old habits, and accordingly we find that our hearts are beating wildly, our breathing coming in gulps, our limbs trembling, the while we look on, mortified at the weakness we cannot control.
We are irritated by the tireless piano next door, exasperated by the teasing child, hurt and vexed by the social snub, angry at the open insult, and perhaps moved to enduring hatred by the obnoxious and unscrupulous enemy. There is a common emotional vein running through all these conditions however much the particular momentary expression may vary.
Possibly resentment is the best name wherewith to label this common factor. The instinctive nature of the motor reactions requires no further demonstration than is furnished by the sight of any little child enjoying a tantrum. The explicitly pugnacious element is, under civilised surroundings, inconspicuous after childhood is passed, despite the tremendous virility it displays if the curb be once slackened.
The evolution of the race has been notoriously sanguinary, and we should feel no surprise, however much of disgust and regret we may entertain, that under the excitement of actual combat the old brute should display the cloven hoof.
The development of so-called civilised codes of war affords interesting instances of the effort rational man makes to clothe with decency the shame of his own brutishness. According to the code, women and children may not be slaughtered, but it is occasionally lawful to despoil them of their flocks and herds, to lay waste their grain, and even to burn the roofs above their heads. Shyness and Sociability. Sociability is simply an expression of the essentially gregarious nature of man.
Some men seem destined for membership in a very small herd,-- two or three at most,-others find their most natural surroundings amid large numbers.
But the man or child who in one form or another does not natively crave. Many turn from life and such companions as they chance to have attracted with horror and disgust, seeking in God or in some ideal of their own imagination a companionship which shall be fit and satisfying.
But what is such a turning other than the most pathetic ap. No, sociability, under whatever limitations, is an expression of the very essence of humanity, and every little child evinces it by shunning solitude. What often passes with children for a love of solitude is really more truly referable to the operation of the contrary instinct of shyness.
In the very nature of the case the two impulses must always have been in unstable equilibrium so long as the drama of human life has been upon the boards. A certain measure of suspicion toward the action and purposes of others must always have been a condition of avoiding harm and imposition.
On the other hand, the race is fundamentally gregarious, and all its greatest achievements have come about through cooperative undertakings in which the solidarity of the social structure has been a sine qua non. It would be a rare person indeed who would not get sad, at least momentarily, when faced with the privations of survival. As this sadness deepens, we label the feeling "depression. The frustrated person becomes more and more angry as he fails to reach his goals.
If the anger does not help the person to succeed, then the frustration level goes even higher. A destructive cycle between anger and frustration continues until the person becomes worn down - physically, emotionally and mentally. When a person reaches this point, he starts to give up and his focus shifts from "What can I do" to "There is nothing I can do. There is nothing wrong with being sad as you temporarily think about your loved ones and remember what life is like back in "civilization" or "the world.
On the other hand, if you allow yourself to sink into a depressed state, then it can sap all your energy and, more important, your will to survive. It is imperative that each individual resist succumbing to depression. Humans are social animals.
This means we, as human beings, enjoy the company of others. Very few people want to be alone all the time! As you are aware, there is a distinct chance of isolation in a survival setting. This is not bad.
Loneliness and boredom can bring to the surface qualities you thought only others had. The extent of your imagination and creativity may surprise you.
When required to do so, you may discover some hidden talents and abilities. Most of all, you may tap into a reservoir of inner strength and fortitude you never knew you had.
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